| Corruption and Economics: A Model of Predictors and Outcomes |
| | Getz, Kathleen A. | American U. | kgetz@american.edu | 202-885-1998 |
| | Volkema, Roger J. | American U. | volkema@american.edu | 202-885-6193 |
| | Recent growth in international trade has raised concerns about differing business practices which can impede commerce
and economic development. One such concern is corruption. While accepting bribes is illegal in virtually all countries and
paying bribes is objectionable in virtually all cultures, it is true that business related bribery seems to be tolerated in some
countries more than in others. Since 1994, there have been extensive efforts within international organizations to harmonize
national approaches to corruption by establishing specific guidelines to suppress bribery in international business. The
effectiveness of these efforts is uncertain.
The purpose of this study was to develop and test a model that integrates various socio-economic factors, including corruption,
economics, culture and public bureaucracy. The analysis revealed that a negative relationship between economic adversity and
wealth was mediated by corruption. Economic adversity was positively related to corruption, and corruption was inversely related
to wealth. One dimension of culture, masculinity, was found to moderate (strengthen) the relationship between economic adversity
and corruption. Other dimensions of culture (power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and collectivism) were positively associated
corruption. There was a negative relationship between the size of the public sector bureaucracy and corruption. The implications
of these results for predicting and enhancing the effectiveness of international agreements are discussed. |
| | Keywords: corruption; economics; culture |
| Seek Ye First the Redemptive Managerial Character of God: Towards a Theology of Management |
| | Dyck, Bruno | U. of Manitoba | bdyck@ms.umanitoba.ca | (204) 474-8184 |
| | Schroeder, David | Canadian Mennonite Bible College | bdyck@ms.umanitoba.ca | (204) 888-6781 |
| | This study provides an analysis of the biblical narrative to develop a theology of
management that provides a "new" moral point of view to loose us from the iron cage of formal
rationality, as called for by Weber (1958) and others (e.g., MacIntyre, 1981). We argue that
management issues are a pre-eminent concern in the Bible, evidenced by being the first identified
reason for which humankind was created and by being Jesus' most taught about topic. The
managerial character of God has three key general obligations: servant leadership, community
building and discernment, and meaningful work that is creative, sustainable and recreative.
Becoming bound to these promises to free people from the "bureaucratic individualism"
characterizing the iron cage. |
| | Keywords: theology; emancipation; moral philospohy |
| Effectiveness in Business-Government Relations: The Role of Corporate Power, Strategies and Tactics |
| | Meznar, Martin Blaine | Arizona State U., West | meznar@asuvm.inre.asu.edu | (602)-543-6125 |
| | Rehbein, Kathleen A. | Marquette U. | rehbein@vms.csd.mu.edu | (414) 288-1446 |
| | Schuler, Douglas A. | Rice U. | schuler@rice.edu | 713-285-5472 |
| | This paper investigates the association between corporate power, business-government relations (BGR) strategy, and the use of specific BGR tactics. It then assesses the direct and indirect relationships between power, strategies, tactics and effective government relations management. Results indicate that power is a significant determinant of the BGR strategy a firm will pursue and that certain strategies are associated with specific tactics. However, neither power nor tactics are directly associated with BGR effectiveness. BGR effectiveness seems to be a function of pursuing a defined BGR strategy.
This study builds on the Meznar & Nigh (1995) types of public affairs (PA) strategies, and applies the same typology to government relations. It finds that large, powerful firms tend to buffer against government interference in their industries using PAC contributions and large PA staffs. Firms that pursue a bridging strategy do not tend to use PAC contributions and have a smaller PA staff. However, bridging firms appear to be more satisfied with the results of their BGR management than buffering firms. Furthermore, neither having a DC office for handling BGR, nor large PAC contributions, nor a large PA staff were significantly associated with greater perceived effectiveness in handling BGR. Large firms considered themselves no more effective at handling BGR than did small firms.
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| | Keywords: business government relations; public affairs; social issues management |