| Collaborating With Competitors: An Empirical Study of the Impact of Inter-Partner Learning on Alliance Outcome |
| | Dussauge, Pierre | HEC, Paris | dussauge@hec.fr | (33) 1 39677279 |
| | Garrette, Bernard | HEC, Paris | garrette@hec.fr | (33) 1 39677321 |
| | Mitchell, Will | U. of Michigan | wmitchel@umich.edu | (734)-764-1230 |
| | We show that alliance outcomes vary systematically across link and scale alliances.
Link alliances are cases in which partners contribute different capabilities, while scale alliances are partnerships in which
firms contribute similar capabilities. We propose that link alliances lead to greater potential levels of learning and
capability acquisition between the partners than do scale alliances. We find that partners are more likely to reorganize
or take over link alliances. Moreover, reorganization and takeover tend to occur earlier among link alliances than
among scale alliances. By contrast, scale alliances are more likely to continue without material changes,
although link alliances that do continue unchanged tend to have particularly long duration. The two types of
alliances are equally likely to shut down, at similar ages. We argue that reorganization and takeover indicate that firms
have acquired capabilities from their partners. The results help shed light on the debate concerning the relative benefits
and risks of alliance activity, while demonstrating that alliances provide an evolutionary means by which business capabilities
diffuse through an industry. Our data include 227 alliances among competing firms in several manufacturing industries
in Europe, North America, and Asia, covering the period from 1952 to 1996. |
| | Keywords: Alliance; Learning; International |
| Co-opetition: An Experimental Investigation |
| | Seale, Darryl A. | Kent State U. | dseale@bsa3.kent.edu | 330-672-2750 x308 |
| | Sundali, James A. | U. of Nevada, Reno | jsundali@scs.unr.edu | 702-787-0426 |
| | Co-opetition has been proposed as a new mindset for strategic managers (Brandenburger & Nalebuff,
1996). Co-opetition argues that competitors should cooperate when it comes to creating a market,
and compete when it comes to dividing it up. A two-player two-stage socio-economic game is created
that captures important elements of co-opetition. In stage 1 two players determine the size of the pie
by a mixed motive simultaneous game. In stage 2 the pie is divided up using ultimatum bargaining.
The results from two experiments are presented and discussed. The first experiment is conducted in a
classroom setting with 160 students enrolled in a capstone strategic management course. The second
experiment is conducted in a controlled computer laboratory with monetary payment contingent upon
performance. There are three primary findings. First, subject behavior in this game differs markedly
from game theoretic predictions. Most subjects play the game much more cooperatively than is
predicted. The concept of reciprocity is a likely explanation of behavior. Second, there is limited
evidence that subjects attempt to both cooperate and compete. Third, the structure of the game
environment has an important influence on the prevalence of co-opetive behavior. In a repeated play
design, subjects are more likely to attempt co-opetition if they are randomly matched with a different
opponent each trial than if they are matched with the same opponent each trial. We conclude with a
discussion of co-opetition from an experimental perspective. |
| | Keywords: co-opetition; cooperative strategy; game theory |
| Strategic Colonialism in Unfamiliar Cultures: Overcoming Extreme Forms of Causal Ambiguity Internationally |
| | Mosakowski, Elaine | Purdue U. | emosakowski@mgmt.purdue.edu | 317-926-0498 |
| | This paper starts with the premise that a manager entering a foreign market may
never achieve in-depth understanding of how the industrial rules of competition or
cooperation in the foreign market are affected by the societal cultural context.
This produces a situation where the manager makes strategic choices under
considerable causal ambiguity about how his choices affect his firm's
performance. As one approach to strategy making in this circumstance, I propose
"strategic colonialism" where the manager to some extent "exports" his firm's
local rules for competitive or cooperative interaction to the foreign market. I
highlight how the well-known success story of Honda's entry into foreign
motorcycle markets is one illustration of strategic colonialism. This paper then
draws upon a combination of economic game theory and operant conditioning
research to describe how entrants can facilitate incumbents' adoption of their
colonial strategies. I also consider the conditions under which this strategy is
more likely to succeed. This paper concludes with a discussion of how a colonial
strategy differs from well-established arguments that firms should carve out a
unique strategy or upset the current competitive landscape with a form of strategic
judo that uses incumbents' accumulated experience against them (Brandenburger
and Nalebuff, 1996). The contribution of strategic colonialism is its emphasis on
how causal understanding may itself be an important competitive weapon through
which an entrant obtains an advantage by instituting a causal model that it
understands better than incumbents do.
|
| | Keywords: uncertainty; foreign entry; innovation |
| Performance Effects of Cooperative and Competitive Strategic Repertoires: The U.S. Airline Industry, 1983-1996 |
| | Domke-Damonte, Darla J. | Coastal Carolina U. | ddamonte@coastal.edu | (843) - 349-2129 |
| | Theoretical development in the integration of cooperation and competition on firm performance has been sparse. Building on the work of Chen and colleagues in competitive rivalry in the airline industry and the conceptual development of Lado and colleagues on the interactive effects of cooperation and competition on firm performance, this study tests the direct and interactive performance effects of cooperation and competition in the U.S. airline industry. The results of the pooled, cross-sectional time series analyses of ten airlines over 14 years indicated some support for the interactive effect of the firm's aggregated cooperative strategic repertoire and competitive strategic repertoires on firm performance. Reputation, unabsorbed slack, computer reservations systems, and environmental munificence were also found to affect performance.
A significant three-way interaction between cooperative strategic repertoire, competitive strategic repertoire, and environmental dynamism suggest that the relationships between the repertoires are much more complex than previously thought. For operating profit margin, a measure of cost management, the highest performance was associated with periods of high environmental dynamism and broad cooperative and competitive repertoires. For revenue per available seat mile, a yield management measure, the highest performance was also associated with broad cooperative and competitive strategic repertoires, but the lowest performance was associated with a narrow range of competitive strategic repertoires.
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| | Keywords: Cooperation; Competition; Performance |