| Intergenerational Discounting: The Role of Time Delay, Uncertainty, and Affinity to Future Generations |
| | Wade-Benzoni, Kimberly A. | New York U. | kbenzoni@stern.nyu.edu | (212)-998-7942 |
| | Some of the most important issues in business and society involve a conflict of interest between present and future generations.
This paper explores how resources are allocated across generations and offers theoretical and empirical groundwork
for the study of intergenerational issues. Three studies examine how the elements of time delay, uncertainty, and affinity
to future generations influence intergenerational discounting. |
| | Keywords: Intergenerational; Discounting; Resource Allocation |
| Are people aware of the endowment effect? Egocentric perceptions of others’ tastes |
| | Van Boven, Leaf | Cornell U. | Leaf.Van.Boven@cornell.edu | 607-255-6444 |
| | Dunning, David | Cornell U. | dad6@cornell.edu | 607-255-6391 |
| | Loewenstein, George | Carnegie Mellon U. | gl20@andrew.cmu.edu | 412-286-8787 |
| | People tend to think that commodities are more valuable simply because they own them. Three studies address whether people are aware of this “endowment effect.” We hypothesize that even though buyers and sellers are generally cognizant of the endowment effect, they tend to underestimate the size of the effect because their estimates of the commodity’s value to the other role is unduly influenced by the commodity’s value to themselves. In other words, people tend to have egocentric perceptions of others’ tastes. In line with this hypothesis, Study 1 showed that buyers underestimated sellers’ reservation prices and sellers overestimated buyers’ reservation prices. Studies 2 and 3 showed that this underestimation led participants who were buying for someone else to make offers that were too low and therefore costly. Study 3 explored the consequences of underestimating the endowment effect for people’s attributions of the other role’s behavior. |
| | Keywords: egocentrism; endowment effect; perspective taking |
| Secrecy, Deception, Retribution, and the Negotiation Process |
| | Boles, Terry L. | U. of Iowa | terry-boles@uiowa.edu | (319)-335-0947 |
| | Croson, Rachel T. A. | U. of Pennsylvania | crosonr@GRACE.WHARTON.upenn.edu | (215)-898-3025 |
| | Murnighan, J. Keith | Northwestern U. | keithm@nwu.edu | (847) 467-3566 |
| | This paper investigates the dynamics of opportunity upon secrecy, and deception in repeated negotiations. Dyads, who were anonymous to one another, played a series of 4-ultimatum type bargaining games for significant amounts of cash using Group Systems™ decision software. To create opportunities for secrecy and deception we varied whether the pie size and outside option were known or unknown (to responder and proposer respectively). To create opportunities for retribution we varied whether pie sizes and outside options, when unknown, were verified or not verified after 2 bargaining trials. Players were able to send messages to one another about pie size, outside options, reasons for offers or rejections. We examined the extent to which negotiators make demands, threaten, lie, call bluffs, and apologize as a function of the above conditions. We found that proposers lie most often when pie sizes are unknown and not verified. Liars who were "exposed" by later verification of pie sizes were more likely than non-liars to increase the size of their offers in later rounds. They were also more likely to receive retribution by having their offers rejected by responder. |
| | Keywords: negotiation; uncertainty; deception |
| The Influence of Physical Attractiveness and Gender on Ultimatum Game Decisions |
| | Schweitzer, Maurice E. | U. of Pennsylvania | maurice@opim.wharton.upenn.edu | (215)-898-4776 |
| | Solnick, Sara J. | U. of Miami | ssolnick@exchange.sba.miami.edu | (305)-284-3736 |
| | We conducted a three stage Ultimatum game experiment to investigate the influence of physical attractiveness and gender on Ultimatum game decisions. Results from this study did not reveal significant differences in the offers or demands attractive and unattractive men and women made, however, attractive people and men were treated differently. Consistent with the “beauty premium,” attractive people were offered more though less was demanded of them. Men were also offered more and less was demanded of them. We discuss implications of these results with respect to bargaining and the labor market. |
| | Keywords: Physical attractiveness; Ultimatum game; Gender |