| Do Networks Really Work?: A Framework for Evaluating Public Sector Organizational Networks |
| | Provan, Keith G. | U. of Arizona | kprovan@bpa.arizona.edu | 520-621-1950 |
| | Milward, H. Brinton | U. of Arizona | bmilward@bpa.arizona.edu | 520-621-7476 |
| | This paper discusses the evaluation of networks of community-based, mostly publicly funded health, human service, and public welfare organizations. Consistent with pressures to perform effectively by a broad range of stakeholders, we argue that networks must be evaluated at three levels of analysis; community, network, and organization/participant levels. These three levels of analysis are closely related but each has its own set of effectiveness criteria that must be considered. We outline these criteria, discussing how effectiveness at one level of network analysis may or may not match effectiveness criteria at another level. We also discuss the importance of key stakeholders and how multiple constituents may be satisfied through the formation and maintenance of service delivery networks. |
| | Keywords: networks; effectiveness; public-sector |
| Indirect accountability in state local relations: The example of solid waste policy in Kentucky |
| | O'Connell, Lenahan Louis | U. of Kentucky | locon0@engr.uky.edu | 606 299-3915 |
| | Intergovernmental relations can be thought of as a hierarchy of authority, as the smaller jurisdictions are nested in the larger. But hierarchical control may not characterize some intergovernmental relations, even when one party is formally superior to the other and the weaker party is subject to financial sanctions. This study of solid waste policy in Kentucky shows that direct exercise of state authority is but one way to achieve accountability. In this case the relationship between the more powerful state and the less powerful local jurisdiction can best be described as structured by mechanisms of indirect accountability. After distinguishing direct from indirect types of accountability, this paper describes the indirect accountability measures employed by the state to enforce the law and avoid accusations of being authoritarian and undemocratic. Its central thesis is that elected state representatives use indirect measures to avoid a backlash at the polls. It documents, moreover, that indirect accountability can induce the desired local effects without alienating the subordinate party. Reliance on indirect accountability thus benefits legislators, but it also benefits regulatory officials, who can play the role of helper more than that of enforcer. With these accountability mechanisms the state can elicit cooperation from the localities. |
| | Keywords: accountability; intergovernmental; solid waste |
| Understanding Interorganizational Cooperation: Public-Private Collaboration in Regulating Financial Market Innovation |
| | Faerman, Sue R. | State U. of New York, Albany | srf90@cnsvax.albany.edu | 518-442-5284 |
| | McCaffrey, David P. | State U. of New York, Albany | dpm75@cnsunix.albany.edu | 518-442-5282 |
| | Van Slyke, David | State U. of New York, Albany | vanslyke@regents.edu | 518-464-8689 |
| | A large body of literature has emerged over the past 15 years on the factors influencing the success or failure of interorganizational
collaboration. Four themes appear repeatedly across this literature: (1) the initial dispositions toward cooperation, (2) the
incentives in play, (3) leadership, and (4) the number and variety of organizations involved. This paper examines how these four
factors, individually and in combination, shaped an effort to design a new approach to regulating financial innovation, called the
Derivatives Policy Group (DPG). In cooperation with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, this group of six large financial firms developed "voluntary" regulatory procedures for
rapidly changing areas of finance. The process succeeded despite formidable obstacles, including competition among the firms and
incentives for both the public and private sectors to resort to adversarial lobbying and legal challenges. In October, 1998, citing
experience with the DPG, the SEC issued rules establishing, with broad support, a flexible approach to regulating financial
innovations. The case is important in and of itself--the financial markets are a major concern of national and international public
policy--but we emphasize its implications for the study and practice of interorganizational cooperation in general. This paper
draws mainly on interviews with individuals involved in the DPG and its subsequent implementation, and the documents generated
during the process.
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| | Keywords: cooperation; collaboration; regulation |