| Corporate Political Management Readiness: The Relationship of Environment-Organization and Performance |
| | Moussetis, Robert C. | North Central College | romousse@noctrl.edu | (630)-637-5475 |
| | Abu-Rahma, Ali | United States International University | aburahma@usiu.edu | (619)-635-4571 |
| | Nakos, George | Clayton College and State U. | georgenakos@mail.clayton.edu | 770 961 3507 |
| | Kriemadis, Athanassios | U. of Thessaly | Kriemadis@uth.gr | 011-301-678-3500 |
| | This paper presents a preliminary empirical investigation of corporate political management readiness. The aspiration of the results is to establish a foundation that would enable corporate management to navigate effectively through environmental shifts and to provide an optimal political response capability that maximizes economic profitability. It establishes a preliminary instrument that facilitates the political posturing of the firm by suggesting what type of managerial political behavior and capability will be appropriate at different levels of environmental turbulence.
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| | Keywords: Strategy; Political; Management |
| The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups and Firms: Lobbying, Litigation, and Administrative Regulation |
| | de Figueiredo, John M. | Massachusetts Institute of Technology | jdefig@mit.edu | 617-258-7253 |
| | de Figueiredo, Rui J. | U. of California, Berkeley | rui@haas.berkeley.edu | 510-642-6452 |
| | There are many ways a firm can change its nonmarket environment. Lobbying politicians,
engaging regulators, and litigating policy outcomes are three of the main mechanisms available
to firms. In this theoretical paper, we examine how lobbying, regulation, and litigation are
intimately linked. We build a two stage model. In this first stage, firms lobby a legislator for a
particular outcome. If the outcome is unfavorable, the firm can then choose to litigate the issue
before a court. We demonstrate in the paper that firms will save money in lobbying so that they
can undertake an aggressive litigation effort, should they lose in the lobbying phase of nonmarket
competition. Moreover, the mere threat of litigation by an opposing interest group can have
profound effects on the lobbying behavior of companies. |
| | Keywords: litigation; lobbying; corporate nonmarket activity |
| An Option Theory Approach to MNC Mode-of-Entry Decisions |
| | Reed, Kira Kristal | U. of Connecticut | kkreed@snet.net | (860)-486-2390 |
| | Previous research on multinational corporations' (MNCs) expansion behavior
has developed along four lines of inquiry. These lines can be summarily
described as the why, how (i.e., acquisition, joint venture, export/license
agreement), where (into which countries), and when of expansion. Research
on MNC expansion behavior has not studied these lines comprehensively in one
study. It is the premise of this paper that MNCs do not make such expansion
decisions independently. Furthermore, to truly encompass the global context
in which these decisions are made, MNCs' relationships with host countries
must be incorporated to better understand MNC expansion patterns within
regions, rather than into individual countries. Using option theory and
portions of the international political economics literature, this paper
presents a theoretical model with testable propositions which predict
MNC mode-of-entry choice. |
| | Keywords: Options; International; Expansion |
| Corporate Strategy for Political Access: A Multivariate Approach |
| | Schuler, Douglas A. | Rice U. | schuler@rice.edu | 713-285-5472 |
| | Rehbein, Kathleen A. | Marquette U. | rehbein@vms.csd.mu.edu | (414) 288-1446 |
| | Cramer, Roxy | Rice U. | roxyc@stat.rice.edu | (713) 527-8101 |
| | This study tests a model of corporate political action, the politically constrained profit maximizing
model in order to look at how firms implement a political access strategy. In this analysis, we define
a political access strategy as consisting of three political tactics, campaign contributions, use of in
house lobbyists, and contracting outside lobbyists which are often used to establish a relationship with
policymakers. Using a relatively new quantitative approach, an alternating logistic regression, we
examined which U.S. manufacturing firms are most likely to implement a comprehensive political
strategies. Our findings indicate that: (1) the largest manufacturing firms with defense contracts are
more likely to expend resources to gain access to key policymakers and (2) firms in politically active
industries and in industries with congressional ties will use multiple tactics to establish relationships
with congresional members. |
| | Keywords: Political; Corporate; Tactics |