| The Role of Organizational Justice in Pay and Employee Benefit Satisfaction, and Its Effects on Work Attitudes |
| | Tremblay, Michel | CIRANO | cirano@cirano.umontreal.ca | (514)-985-4000 |
| | Sire, Bruno | U. of Toulouse | sire@univ-tlse1.fr | (05)-61524758 |
| | Balkin, David B. | U. of Colorado, Boulder | david.balkin@boulder.edu | (303)-492-5780 |
| | The objective of this research, using a sample of 600 canadian employees, is to investigate the influence of distributive and procedural justice on pay and benefit satisfaction, and other related work attitudes. |
| | Keywords: Organizational Justice; Compensation; Satisfaction |
| The Construct of Contingent Pay Satisfaction: Adding a New Dimension to the Pay Satisfaction Questionnaire |
| | Sturman, Michael C. | Louisiana State U. | msturma@lsu.edu | 225-388-6195 |
| | Short, Jeremy C. | Louisiana State U. | jshort@tiger.lsu.edu | (225)-388-6114 |
| | There are both practical and theoretical reasons to measure contingent pay satisfaction. We present theoretical arguments that contingent pay satisfaction constitutes a separate component of pay satisfaction, fitting into the Pay Satisfaction Questionnaire’s (PSQ, Heneman & Schwab, 1985) theoretical framework. Using confirmatory factor analyses, we show that contingent pay satisfaction is distinct from other pay satisfaction dimensions. We also provide evidence of convergent and discriminant validity by showing that bonus-related items are more related to the contingent pay satisfaction measure than other PSQ dimensions. |
| | Keywords: Pay Satisfaction; Contingent Pay; PSQ |
| Cultural Specifics and Universals in Employee Responses to Pay Contingencies |
| | Hagan, Christine M. | Florida Atlantic U. | chag6182@fau.edu | (305) 937-2724 |
| | Peterson, Mark F. | Florida Atlantic U. | MPeterso@fau.edu | (561) 297-3654 |
| | Perceptions that pay is contingent on individual performance, work-related individual characteristics, and group performance are compared between two countries and used to predict general pay attitudes and organization trust. Data from two survey administrations at one U.S. plant and one administration at the parent plant in Japan indicate that pay is viewed as more dependent on individual performance than on either individual characteristics or group performance contingencies in the U.S. The reverse is found in Japan. General pay attitudes and organization trust are associated with individual performance contingencies in both countries. Individual characteristic contingencies are associated with pay attitudes and trust in one of the two U.S. survey administrations. The research is framed and the results discussed in relation to culture dimensions such as individualism-collectivism, time orientation, and particularism-universalism.
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| | Keywords: pay; performance; cross-cultural |
| Wealth Creation and Managerial Pay: MVA and EVA as Determinants of Executive Compensation |
| | Desai, Anand S. | Kansas State U. | adesai@ksu.edu | (785)-532-6892 |
| | Fatemi, Ali | Kansas State U. | fatemi@ksu.edu | (785)-532-6892 |
| | Katz, Jeffrey P. | Kansas State U. | jkatz@ksu.edu | (785)-532-7451 |
| | The design of incentive compatible executive-compensation policies is a crucial element for firms that seek a competitive advantage in an effort to maximize owner wealth. In this paper, we examine the relationship between executive compensation and measures of firm performance that capture the economic profit earned by the firm, namely, EVA and MVA. We test the hypothesis that after controlling for risk, these measures are more effective measures of wealth creation and hence executive compensation. We find that firm size and risk are related to the pay of top executives. We also find evidence that top manager pay is related to market value added to the firm during the year. By grouping firms into cohorts based on polar performance (high/low) for each performance measure, we are able to provide additional insights about executive compensation. By controlling for the relative level of performance, executive compensation plans reward top managers for their relative level of contribution to the wealth of owners. Finally, we assess whether top manager pay is an incentive for future performance or reward for past behavior. Our evidence suggests that top managers are incented to increase the EVA of the firm but are also rewarded for past additions the market value as measured by MVA. |
| | Keywords: Executive compensation; Market value added; Economic value added |