| Corporate Governance Convergence in a Globalizing Equity Market |
| Presenter | Useem, Michael | U. of Pennsylvania | useem@wharton.upenn.edu | (215)-258-7684 |
| | While the American model of corporate governance hinges upon the distinctively Anglo-Saxon shareholder value ideology, traditional models of most continental European Union (EU) countries reflect cultural values substantially different from and often at odds with shareholder value primacy. While recent developments (e.g., globalization, privatization, European Monetary Union) have produced forceful pressures toward injecting shareholder value into EU corporate governance, traditional European cultural values and other institutional features are proving to be a formidable, some argue insurmountable, obstacle to overcome. This leads to the question of whether continental EU systems of corporate governance can and will actually converge toward that very same Anglo-Saxon shareholder value ideology most of them have traditionally ostracized: Is a Pluralistic World likely to converge toward One Model of corporate governance?
This symposium will tackle this question from multiple angles, both theoretically and empirically. An initial argument will be made that convergence toward Anglo-Saxon standards is likely, above and beyond country-specific institutional features. Contrasting this perspective, another argument will be made that distinctively different institutional features undermine the validity of any convergence hypothesis. This 'theoretical tension' is addressed empirically, from multiple angles, by three analyses investigating change and development of corporate governance models in three continental EU countries - France, Italy, and Spain - and three Anglo-Saxon countries - Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Yet the question remains unanswered, as a final integrative discussion will highlight, and will be thrown open to the audience for debate.
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| | Keywords: governance; Anglo-Saxon; European |
| Convergence of Corporate Governance Models? Maybe Not |
| Presenter | Guillen, Mauro F. | Princeton/U. of Pennsylvania | guillen@wharton.upenn.edu | (215) 573-6267 |
| | While the American model of corporate governance hinges upon the distinctively Anglo-Saxon shareholder value ideology, traditional models of most continental European Union (EU) countries reflect cultural values substantially different from and often at odds with shareholder value primacy. While recent developments (e.g., globalization, privatization, European Monetary Union) have produced forceful pressures toward injecting shareholder value into EU corporate governance, traditional European cultural values and other institutional features are proving to be a formidable, some argue insurmountable, obstacle to overcome. This leads to the question of whether continental EU systems of corporate governance can and will actually converge toward that very same Anglo-Saxon shareholder value ideology most of them have traditionally ostracized: Is a Pluralistic World likely to converge toward One Model of corporate governance?
This symposium will tackle this question from multiple angles, both theoretically and empirically. An initial argument will be made that convergence toward Anglo-Saxon standards is likely, above and beyond country-specific institutional features. Contrasting this perspective, another argument will be made that distinctively different institutional features undermine the validity of any convergence hypothesis. This 'theoretical tension' is addressed empirically, from multiple angles, by three analyses investigating change and development of corporate governance models in three continental EU countries - France, Italy, and Spain - and three Anglo-Saxon countries - Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Yet the question remains unanswered, as a final integrative discussion will highlight, and will be thrown open to the audience for debate.
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| | Keywords: governance; Anglo-Saxon; European |
| The Anglo-Saxon and the Continental Coroporate Governance Models: Where do Italy and Spain Fit? |
| | Aguilera, Ruth V. | Harvard U. | Aguilera@wjh.harvard.edu | 617-496-3912 |
| | While the American model of corporate governance hinges upon the distinctively Anglo-Saxon shareholder value ideology, traditional models of most continental European Union (EU) countries reflect cultural values substantially different from and often at odds with shareholder value primacy. While recent developments (e.g., globalization, privatization, European Monetary Union) have produced forceful pressures toward injecting shareholder value into EU corporate governance, traditional European cultural values and other institutional features are proving to be a formidable, some argue insurmountable, obstacle to overcome. This leads to the question of whether continental EU systems of corporate governance can and will actually converge toward that very same Anglo-Saxon shareholder value ideology most of them have traditionally ostracized: Is a Pluralistic World likely to converge toward One Model of corporate governance?
This symposium will tackle this question from multiple angles, both theoretically and empirically. An initial argument will be made that convergence toward Anglo-Saxon standards is likely, above and beyond country-specific institutional features. Contrasting this perspective, another argument will be made that distinctively different institutional features undermine the validity of any convergence hypothesis. This 'theoretical tension' is addressed empirically, from multiple angles, by three analyses investigating change and development of corporate governance models in three continental EU countries - France, Italy, and Spain - and three Anglo-Saxon countries - Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Yet the question remains unanswered, as a final integrative discussion will highlight, and will be thrown open to the audience for debate.
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| | Keywords: governance; Anglo-Saxon; European |
| Privitization and Corportate Governance Transformation: The Case of France |
| | Goyer, Michel | Massachusetts Institute of Technology/Harvard U. | Mgoyer@mit.edu | 617-495-4303 |
| | While the American model of corporate governance hinges upon the distinctively Anglo-Saxon shareholder value ideology, traditional models of most continental European Union (EU) countries reflect cultural values substantially different from and often at odds with shareholder value primacy. While recent developments (e.g., globalization, privatization, European Monetary Union) have produced forceful pressures toward injecting shareholder value into EU corporate governance, traditional European cultural values and other institutional features are proving to be a formidable, some argue insurmountable, obstacle to overcome. This leads to the question of whether continental EU systems of corporate governance can and will actually converge toward that very same Anglo-Saxon shareholder value ideology most of them have traditionally ostracized: Is a Pluralistic World likely to converge toward One Model of corporate governance?
This symposium will tackle this question from multiple angles, both theoretically and empirically. An initial argument will be made that convergence toward Anglo-Saxon standards is likely, above and beyond country-specific institutional features. Contrasting this perspective, another argument will be made that distinctively different institutional features undermine the validity of any convergence hypothesis. This 'theoretical tension' is addressed empirically, from multiple angles, by three analyses investigating change and development of corporate governance models in three continental EU countries - France, Italy, and Spain - and three Anglo-Saxon countries - Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Yet the question remains unanswered, as a final integrative discussion will highlight, and will be thrown open to the audience for debate.
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| | Keywords: governance; Anglo-Saxon; European |
| Change in Anglo-Saxon Corporate Governance: Structures, Effects, and Transferability of Director Professionalism |
| Chair | Marchese, Eugenio | Cornell U. | em35@cornell.edu | (607)-255-5517 |
| | While the American model of corporate governance hinges upon the distinctively Anglo-Saxon shareholder value ideology, traditional models of most continental European Union (EU) countries reflect cultural values substantially different from and often at odds with shareholder value primacy. While recent developments (e.g., globalization, privatization, European Monetary Union) have produced forceful pressures toward injecting shareholder value into EU corporate governance, traditional European cultural values and other institutional features are proving to be a formidable, some argue insurmountable, obstacle to overcome. This leads to the question of whether continental EU systems of corporate governance can and will actually converge toward that very same Anglo-Saxon shareholder value ideology most of them have traditionally ostracized: Is a Pluralistic World likely to converge toward One Model of corporate governance?
This symposium will tackle this question from multiple angles, both theoretically and empirically. An initial argument will be made that convergence toward Anglo-Saxon standards is likely, above and beyond country-specific institutional features. Contrasting this perspective, another argument will be made that distinctively different institutional features undermine the validity of any convergence hypothesis. This 'theoretical tension' is addressed empirically, from multiple angles, by three analyses investigating change and development of corporate governance models in three continental EU countries - France, Italy, and Spain - and three Anglo-Saxon countries - Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Yet the question remains unanswered, as a final integrative discussion will highlight, and will be thrown open to the audience for debate.
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| | Keywords: governance; Anglo-Saxon; European |